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Poland and the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)

Prof. PhD Krzysztof Miszczak

Professor in the Institute of Analyses and Strategic Studies in Warsaw/Milanówek, Institute President. Professor in the University of International Affairs in Łódź. Former Director of the Department of European Security Policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Since 2005, Director of Department of Foreign Affairs in the Chancellery of the Prime Minister. Expert on foreign policy and security. Author of over 150 publications.

Introduction

Preservation of a relatively stable system of security on a regional scale in the globalised world confronted with asymmetric threats and new type of wars has undoubtedly become a more difficult and expensive task. Security of Europe is merely one of global security aspects and by no means the most important one. Fast and efficient identification of threats in the territory of the Treaty and at the outskirts of the European continent (the time to prepare and take response has shortened to a minimum) has become the focal point for the achievement of maximum preventive and stabilisation capacities of Community structures. Counteracting international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their carriers as well as response to regional crises and conflicts is a necessity for determined opposition to the pressure of global terrorism. Effective prevention of such threats without close cooperation with globally operating universal superpower, the United States, is still impossible given military weakness of the EU.

Although the end of confrontation between the East and the West improved security in Europe, it did not automatically create a stable peace situation on the European continent.

By contrast, particularly bloody conflicts in the Western Balkans and the continued outbreak of new low intensity conflicts permanently destabilised that situation. Lack of unity and coordination of the European states in taking actions on the continent only worsened the situation. The European Union was no longer able to prevent escalation of conflict situation and consequently prevent humanitarian disasters in its immediate neighbourhood. Events such as the outbreak of military conflicts in Kosovo, unstable regimes in Belarus and Ukraine, conflicts in the Middle East, Africa (Sudan-Darfur), Somalia, Central Asia, migrations and costs of rebuilding structures struck by conflicts have directly affected the Member States and their security.

The "European" war in the Balkans clearly showed that the twelve Member States did not have sufficient joint civil and military instruments in their foreign and security policy. EU actions required logistic and military assistance of the United States1. Acceptance of such a state of affairs would imply recognition of the military domination of the US on a regional and global scale. Increased responsibility of the EU for security of its "own" European area and EU outskirts became a necessity. In addition, growing frustration within the North Atlantic Treaty with the Washington policy and the obvious difference in perception and definition of crisis situations between the Europeans and Americans accelerated the process of consolidation of the security and defence policy of the EU2.

Conclusions drawn from such experience were obvious: a) the European Union has to be able to respond fast to prevent conflicts with civil measures; b) however, sole use of means of civil prevention is not sufficient; c) solution of international conflicts also requires the use of military measures; d) military measures cannot be applied without civil measures, they must be applied jointly as part of the ESDP being developed.

Development of an autonomous ESDP was started during European Council session in Cologne on June 3-4, 1999, and then based on the decisions of the European Council agreed at the Helsinki meeting in December 1999. This development was stimulated by a change in the UK's position, which had been cautious of development of European military forces. Changes occurred at the British-French summit in St. Malo (December 3-4, 1998) at which both parties stressed the need for the EU to develop its own military capacity.

The supreme goal of the ESDP was to be the accumulation of means and forces in order to strengthen operating capacity of the EU outside. Creation of civil and military capacity of the EU were to be instruments for prevention, counteraction and management of crisis situations3.

In time, the ESDP became the most important segment of the integration process of Europe in recent years4.

When the Treaty of Nice came into effect on February 1, 2003, its provisions strengthened and developed the ESDP operative components as an EU autonomous project5. From that moment, the EU would define and execute all areas of common security and foreign policy (Art. 11-13 of the TEU). Given continuing differences in opinions in the EU, the provisions of the Treaty of Nice on the security and foreign policy still stressed only: "progressive framing of a common defence policy which might lead to common defence if the European Council decides so." 6

The Treaty of Nice was a political compromise reached at the lowest level. Differences among the Member States on the ESDP diluted the military element of the common defence concept, prevented definition of the final form of the policy and well-thought purposefulness of the common defence policy in the future. Mutually exclusive concerns of the Member States included issues of civil element reduction at the cost of expanding the military component of the EU. On the other hand, some advocated the clear ESDP profile as the natural element for the construction of the autonomous military force of the EU with global involvement. Yet others claimed that the Europeans should contribute to NATO more, and the ESDP was to be the foundations for that contribution7.

As part of the ESDP, the EU mustered to become involved in the Balkans. On March 31, 2003, the European Union started the first military operation in its history, in Macedonia (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, FYROM).8

In 2003, it was not the Iraqi situation crisis but provisions on permanent agreements between NATO and the EU that regulated the EU's use of NATO command structures during operations led by the EU. The so-called Berlin-plus9 agreement between both organisations allowed the EU to launch Concordia military operation in Macedonia10, as a continuation of NATO's Allied Harmony operation. Despite that fact, it were the consequences of the Iraqi crisis that created political divisions in Europe which further led to a strategic discussion within the European Union on the Community security policy in the future. The goal was obvious-to boost Brussels' foreign policy and attempt to develop its military arm in the form of a common defence identity.

The first European Security Strategy (ESS) of December 12, 200311 received strong support from the Member States. It was the only document of that organisation which passed without major objections. The European Security Strategy was not only the European answer to the National Security Strategy of the United States (NSS). It defined the extended concept of security and threats of cross-border terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts and collapsed states. It recognized similar threats on both sides of the Atlantic and suggested indivisibility of the security aspect in the Euro-Atlantic area12.

It was also important that the ESS was not considerably different (threat definition) from the National Security Strategy of the United States13. However, the ESS is only a starting concept for further development of the ESDP14.

Poland, the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, and the ESDP development

Before joining the European Union, for a long time Poland did not have direct impact on the ESDP development. The Member States were not interested in the applicant state participation in the development of security structures of the political and economic area of the Western Europe. Given lack of actual aspect of security guarantee, the new ESDP project was not perceived by the Polish government as an alternative to ensuring security of the state. Past experience of the Polish state was not optimistic. Past guaranties of the Western powers used to be hollow paper-drawn protections. In its policy as an independent state, Poland sought hard guaranties, which could only be provided by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation or another efficient and credible international system. The demonstrated lack of trust to European security guaranties was reflected every day by the foreign and security policy of the European powers which mainly represented their own interests, not the Community ones.

Relatively poor trust of Poland to European partners at the first stage of the independent existence of the Polish State (since 1989) was also affected by strong re-nationalising tendencies in the foreign policy of the largest Polish neighbour in the West, Germany15, and neo-imperial ambitions in the policy pursued by the Russian Federation (including the so-called "near abroad") in the East. Lack of stabilisation in the European continent proved rightness of strategy being pursued. As a result of supporting the NATO, Euro-Atlantic option, represented by the United States, Warsaw was sceptical of attempts to strengthen the second EU pillar as it supposed that the ESDP development would drift the Western European states away from transatlantic security structures, and consequently weaken NATO, the future foundations for the Polish security policy. Along with the outline of the Common European Security and Defence Policy and Poland's accession to NATO, Warsaw's position began to evolve towards a more flexible approach. As long as Poland pursued the process of integration with the EU, it could not be a rightful co-creator of EU security policy framework. Despite that fact, Warsaw demonstrated a declarative support for the development of European anti-crisis forces, among others.

In its first (after regaining sovereignty) Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, adopted at the meeting of the Council of Ministers on January 4, 2000, Poland recognized development of Community political and military structures as the second, next to NATO, pillar of state security. The government also declared participation of Poland in development of the Common European Security and Defence Policy and offered participation of Polish troops in anti-crisis forces of the EU. Polish security policy could be described as development of a framework split between NATO and the EU, manifested by Warsaw through participation of Polish forces in the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI), the European Headline Goal (EHG) and the Common Capabilities Goal (CCG) of the European Union16.

September 11 events (terrorist attacks on the US) swayed this seemingly pragmatic approach of Polish political elites. Poland became involved in the ESDP issue on 15+6 forum comprising the Member States and six non-Member States which belonged to NATO17. The talks were difficult. Polish delegations signalled even discriminating approach of certain Member States. The destructive policy was mainly pursued by France, backed by Germany, although not so openly. Common ESDP discussions brought little benefits, were frustrating and artificially supported by Brussels to sustain political control of the other party. Such "talks" resulted in discouragement and popular belief that principles of European partnership were true only for the major Member States. The goal was not the political integration of the whole Europe but propaganda and political dimension of the ESDP. With growing differences on directions of the security policy among the states and their ambitions going beyond the classical EU territory as well as the lack of financial effort to improve defence potential of the Western Europe, the ESDP policy became implausible in the eyes of future Member States.

Increased threat posed by the international terrorism resulted in a slow ESDP consolidation but also divided the European states with regard to their position on cooperation with the United States in the light of the Iraqi conflict. Poland consistently supported the US policy, which led to distrust and even hostility towards Poland, mainly in France and Germany. The situation was further fuelled by the so-called letter of "8", a solidarity manifest of eight European leaders including Poland, with the US policy. Warsaw was reproached that it was a blind extension of American interests in the European continent (the so-called US Trojan Horse in Europe). One could feel that the criticism was addressed towards Washington by expressing it to the "weak link" of US interests in Europe, Poland, a state which queued in line to integration with the European Union and "should" have cooperated with Brussels, not Washington.

Poland realised that the future of the European security and defence policy without agreed positions of three main actors in the European continent, France, Germany and Great Britain, would not be possible. In the constellation of interests of European community member states, Warsaw spoke in favour of strengthened integration of European states in that field, with respect for sovereignty of other states and their legal independence.

For Poland, formulation of the EU Security Strategy positively resulted in the discussion on coordination of instruments and operating and military capacities within the ESDP. Not a member of Community structures yet, at first Warsaw did not realize the full importance of Convention decision on the future Constitutional Treaty affecting the whole EU and the future ESDP.

Thus Poland persistently rejected the concepts of closer cooperation within the EU fearing division of security in the European and transatlantic area. However, the French-German-British compromise of November 2003 and in particular, the attitude of Britain and neutral states in this issue gained Polish support. Poland manifested to Brussels its positive position on creation of a planning unit related to NATO planning system and national command headquarters to transform the ESDP into an effective crisis response tool. The first EU Security Strategy gained full support in Poland as well.

Still, in the negotiation debates within the European Convention, the Member States failed to formulate joint position defining common interests and strategic goals of the EU on security policy.

Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU (CFSP): the ESDP also remained the domain of governments and the European Commission as part of that Policy. The European Union must decide whether its existing position in the security policy of preserving balance among national positions, Community or international interest of the European Union would be continued, or whether the EU intends to play an independent role in the international arena and should boost the ESDP development by accelerating integration processes and assigning and accumulating resources.

Polish participants in the works of the Convention faced a structure which had little in common with rules of democracy. The autocratic style of holding Convention meetings by the former French President, Valery Giscard d'Estaing, which mainly represented French interest, or at best, interests of major Member States, completed the image of flagrant personnel and political shortcomings in the structure which laid foundations for the future Community Constitution. The greatest weakness of the Polish party was the lack of elementary discussion on the progress and provisions of the Convention with and within Polish society. The "debate" was limited to a narrow group of experts working in the atmosphere of a political risk resembling that of the golden times of conspiracy theories. The fundamental ineffectiveness of state structures negatively crowned that image.

The situation slowly began to change at the final stage of negotiations on the Constitutional Treaty, when the Polish delegation mobilised by the opposition became more active and dynamic and appreciated the scale of tasks ahead of Poland and the EU. Despite all drawbacks of the Treaty, the delegation saw the opportunity of joining the trend to influence the development of the community nature of the European Union, in particular in the area of security policy. Strengthening of external Community structures would be in the greatest Polish interest, assuming that the EU would increase its operating effectiveness by extending integration with regard to the CFSP. At the final stage of negotiating the CFSP Development Treaty, Poland was also in favour of the maximum openness of the process and rejection of any discrimination practices.

This was particularly visible when the so-called closer cooperation, "two-speed Europe", "Pioneer Group" or "Avant-garde" was promoted in the EU. According to Warsaw, such concepts led to divisions within the Community by separating closely cooperating small group of countries, instead of strengthening Community structures. As a result, this would not only weaken the Community structure, but most of all, grounds for ensuring security of the Polish state by NATO18. The need to maintain and develop a harmonious cooperation between Europe and the United States still falls into principles of the Polish foreign policy and security policy.

Despite visible lack of persistence in the Polish foreign policy, and Warsaw's manoeuvres between Brussels and Washington, incomprehensible for third parties, this policy was an expression of the aforementioned principles. Poland was vitally interested in the active development of the new system of European security, primarily based on the EU ESDP. Warsaw believed that such a system of European security could not be separated from the transatlantic system in any way in decision-making processes. For that reason, in the course of discussions on the future European Constitution, Poland:

1.
Persistently rejected the concepts of closer cooperation within the EU fearing division of security in the European and transatlantic area19. However, the French-German-British compromise of November 2003 and in particular, the attitude of Britain and neutral states in this issue gained Polish support.

2.
In its evaluation of Art. I-40 and III-213 and the so-called Protocol on permanent structured cooperation in the draft Constitution, the Polish party highlighted weaknesses of proposed articles from the viewpoint of Warsaw interests. Structured, deepened cooperation could not be only internal affair of the group establishing the cooperation, but of the whole EU. Decision on establishing such a cooperation should be made by the European Council, not a group of selected Member States.

3.
The Polish party was not completely convinced of the actual premises behind the idea for development of structured cooperation within the Community, being concerned with the risk of development of hegemony structures within the Community. Contrary to declarations of the project authors regarding development of crisis response capacity, the political dimension of the idea became obvious. Lack of focus on requirements to harmonize efforts with NATO and no access to abilities developed as part of structured cooperation confirmed the possibility that the project would be instrumentalised in the transatlantic relations.

4.
Further doubts pertained to the activities of the European Defence Agency20. According to the Protocol on permanent structured cooperation, participating Member States were to take part in major European armament programmes21. Given purchases of military equipment in the US and other non-European countries, Poland could not have agreed to that fact and supported openness of the Agency to cooperation with other non-European organisations in this field.

5.
The wording of Art. 4 of the Protocol pertaining to the Agency's preparation of annual reports on the evaluation of member states contribution was problematic. It provided the tool for excluding an Agency member state which failed to fulfil obligations pertaining to structured cooperation, with the consent of such a member state.22

6.
Negative response to Convention proposals to introduce a collective defence clause to the Treaty imposing an alliance obligation of all for all member states in case of an aggression against one of such countries went in the same direction. Poland did not want to back that clause claiming that the effect of the clause without reference to Art. 51 of the UN Charter or provisions of the Washington Treaty would lead to a situation where Warsaw would like to prevent establishment of an "European NATO" competitive to the Alliance.

7.
Thus, Poland was negative of the idea to establish an independent EU military command in Tervuen in Belgium that would be competitive to NATO.

8.
At the final stage of consultations in the Convention, Poland manifested to Brussels its positive position on the establishment of a planning unit related to the NATO planning system and national headquarters, in order to transform the ESDP into an effective crisis response tool.

9.
Poland saw no conflict between continued development of the European Security and Defence Policy and the relations with the Alliance as Poland perceived that it would increase the defence potential of the EU and thus strengthen the European component in NATO. In this context, Warsaw supported the French-German-British initiative to establish Battle Groups as it believed it would be a genuine contribution into development of the actual ESDP operating force23.

10.
The first EU Security Strategy24 gained full support in Poland. It was the only EU document adopted without major objections. Not only did the European Security Strategy defined the extended concept of security and threats of cross-border terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, collapsed states or organised crime similar to the Polish security doctrine, but it also recognized similar threats on both sides of the Atlantic and suggested indivisibility of the security aspect in the Euro-Atlantic area25. Warsaw found it also important that the ESS was not considerably different from the National Security Strategy of the United States26.

Cooperation activities of Poland with regard to the ESDP could be described as complex partnership. The foreign and security policy of the state was focused on perception of the ESDP as a keystone between the European integration process and the transatlantic security cooperation within NATO, which had to lead to conflicts between Brussels and Warsaw. Instead of expanding, manoeuvring abilities of the Polish foreign policy have been considerably restricted.

With rejection of the Treaty by France and Holland, the prospect for development of the effective ESDP, establishment of an office of the EU Minister of Foreign Affairs and shortening of decision-making process in the 25 EU has moved away. Which was welcomed by Poland, which persistently opposed to the construction of legal cross-regional structures in the Community. The whole operating scope of the ESDP had to remain under national administrations, a mutually exclusive task.

According to the Treaty, the European Union should develop towards establishment of the common defence system for the Member States to influence external relations of the organisation and the internal regulations of the Member States27. The so-called concept of territorial defence of the Member States resulting from "liquidity" of security limits, resulting from new paradigms of threats, had already been included in the European Security Strategy of 2003. In this context, extension of the spectrum of Petersburg tasks provided for by Art. 41.1 equipped the EU with instruments of a global regulator and negotiator in international crises. The existing tasks would be expanded with disarmament issues, advisory and military assistance, prevention of conflicts as well as post-conflict stabilisation-namely, all the areas which are important for counteracting multinational terrorism at present and in the future.

Introduction of the mutual assistance clause to the Community law would be just as important and innovative element (Art. I-41.2 of the Constitutional Treaty), which should correspond to the Polish security interests.

With an unanimous decision (!) of the European Council, in a specific situation in ad hoc operations, the European Union might become a true defence association, and finally become equipped with an actually strong military arm. Still, the transatlantic relations would remain intact, as the Polish political class imagined. Thus, the clause of Member State collective assistance would be in line with both the UN and NATO obligations. Along with I-43 of the Constitutional Treaty, the EU would also introduce the so-called solidarity clause that would allow the organisation members to jointly counteract threats within the territory of the EU. In addition, the Treaty would take into account the varying degree of military abilities of the Member States, providing grounds for strengthened and continuous structured cooperation at various intensity levels.

Basing on the experience of multinational tactical forces such as Eurocorps or the German-Dutch Corps, the Member States might achieve a higher degree of military integration, in accordance with Art. I-41.6 of the Constitutional Treaty. In this manner, continued structured cooperation would complement the enhanced cooperation on the ESDP included in the Treaty of Nice with a military component28.

Without adoption of the Constitutional Treaty there will be no closer institutional cooperation or strengthened cooperation in the defence area. This issue was not regulated in the Treaty of Nice (Art. 27b of the Treaty of Nice). Despite that fact, the practice of cooperation among selected Member States proved that cooperation in the field of joint operations is possible and could be successfully pursued (i.e. Concordia and Artemis operations). Military missions can be led and continued by a group of Member States without underlying treaties.

On one hand, Poland wanted to see a militarily strong Europe. On the other hand, Poland opposed adoption of that form of the Treaty achieved by the Convention. Inconsistencies of such a policy were obvious and the Member States of the EU which Poland was to join were concerned about the sense of such an integration in the military area. The Polish party forgot that membership in the EU cannot be partial.

When Germany and France initiated establishment of the European Security and Defence Union (ESDU) to accelerate the process of creating Community security and defence policy of the Member States, Poland rejected the project suspecting both states of attempting to increase their control powers within the EU29.

The Belgium proposal to hold a meeting of France, Germany, Belgium, and Luxembourg on the ESDP on April 29, 2003 was a specific continuation of the aforementioned French-German project. The meeting was yet another testimony to deep diversification of positions of the European states on this issue.

The joint statement30 included a number of items already discussed on the Convention; the approval of the ESDU project was proposed, but it was also stressed that the four states would undertake their own steps to develop a "strengthened cooperation" in the defence area, thus referring to the old, controversial German concept of Kerneuropa, which had been previously criticized, defining the leading role of a group of states in the European integration. In 2004, the headquarters were planned to be established for rapid reaction force and command structures independent of the Alliance structures. According to the participants of the meeting, the goal of the proposal of the Four was to strengthen and accelerate works on the ESDP. Participation in the project was open to any Member State and any future member states of the EU could actively participate. The concept was severely criticized by Poland and other Member States, as well as by the US as being definitely anti-American. Great Britain and other European states did not agree to participate and the positions of France (self-reliant Europe) and Germany (strong Europe in partner trans-Atlantic relations and NATO) did not converge. In such a situation, the project had little chances of success.

Poland in EU civil and military operations

EUFOR ALTHEA. An EU military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which started in December 2004. In February 2007 the EU confirmed the decision of December 2006 on gradual EUFOR reduction. During the reduction, a manoeuvrable battalion consisting of Polish, Italian, Spanish and Turkish troops was the core force of EUFOR. The new EUFOR structure quickly attained operating capability on May 27, 2007. By July, the Polish military contingent will have dropped to some 170 troops. The contingent is a part of the Multinational Task Force North (MTFN) with headquarters in Tuzla.

EUPM: the police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The main tasks of the mission include aid in implementation of the reform of the Bosnian police and provision of support to authorities in combatting organised crime. Six representatives of the Polish police participate in the mission.

Future EU mission on Law and Order and Police in Kosovo. The future civil mission will consist of over 1,000 people. Polish police intends to appoint 10 experts for the mission. In addition, Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration has initially agreed to maintain a Polish special police unit in Kosovo (approx. 120 people).

EUBAM Moldova/Ukraine. An observation and advisory mission of the EU started on the Ukrainian and Moldavian border on December 1. Poland is the most represented state in the mission structures (conflict in Transdniestria). At present, 18 Poles serve in the group of 70 international experts.

EUJUST LEX. The mission started in July 2005 and was extended until the end of 2007. The mission includes organisation of training of Iraqi judges, prosecutors, police and prison services. Polish representatives took part in training of Iraqis on the reform of the justice system.

EU involvement in Afghanistan. Poland will send two Polish police experts to Afghanistan and will support mission operations in the Kabul Police Academy.

EU-UN cooperation. Support mission for the MONUS (UN peace mission in the DRC) and deployment of forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo to supervise the election process. The EU also carried out EUFOR RD Congo operation (from June to November 2006). Poland provided one of the largest military contingents with 131 troops.

In March 2006, Poland generally declared forces for the EU needs. The quality of offered crisis response capabilities was particularly stressed (liquidation of contamination, air support and transport, military police forces and civil-military cooperation, CIMIC) 31.

Poland and Battle Groups

Discussions during Convention meetings working on the Constitutional Treaty and the ESS recommendations directly led to decisions aimed at establishment of the so-called EU Battle Groups. For this purpose, a new European Headline Goal 2010 was formulated as part of the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) creation32. The new Headline Goal 2010 reflected provisions of the European Security Strategy, strategic evolution of the international environment, technological development and conclusions from EU operations33.

Three concepts of rapid response forces, namely NATO Response Force, European Rapid Reaction Force and Battle Groups are closely interrelated and permeate each other34. Concerns of competitiveness with regard to political and military obligations in both organisations and thus weakening of the US role on the European continent and on the global scale in the future might become an actual option for the US. Washington was also sceptical of the project of establishing European military capabilities of the Member States by 2010 as part of the European Headline Goal35. Within development of the permanent structured cooperation, members obliged themselves to deploy either own national contingents or deliver own military units by 2007 as a contribution into the multinational contingent of European military forces. Such a contingent should contribute to development of the European rapid reaction forces supporting construction of the Common European Security and Defence Policy, operate under the UN mandate, and be able to carry out two military operations at a time.

The French-German-British initiative to create Battle Groups is becoming an actual contribution into creation of an actual ESDP operating force. As part of the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) creation, thirteen battle groups have been established. The battle groups are mobile rapid response units consisting of approx. 1,500 troops. Each group is capable of launching operations in 10-15 days for an operation lasting 30-120 days36. Out of the thirteen groups, nine are multinational. A single group can be commissioned a task to operate in an independent mission (Art. I-41.5, Art. III-310). The task can be also fulfilled by the civil-military headquarters of the EU, established in 2005. Given the inter-governmental nature of the European Security and Defence Policy, the decision on the participation in civil-military operations of a given Member State is made by that Member State itself37.

Rejection of the Constitutional Treaty has no impact on continued pursuit of the Battle Groups concept, since in autumn 2004 the ministers of defence of the Member States decided to create such units.

Brussels saw the need to improve the defence potential of the EU and increase own regional importance of the Organisation in the dimension of global security.

In such a situation, rejection of the Treaty may lead to a situation that a closer cooperation of Member States may be established under the ESDP outside the institutional structure of the EU.

Undoubtedly it would involve cooperation and fulfilment of national interests of Germany, France and Great Britain, adversely affecting establishment of the ESDP. Various level of cooperation of the three states with the United States would also disturb integration under the ESDP. Indisputably, Member States still lack common security climate that would support development of a joint defence culture. Development of that culture could be enforced by the office of the EU Minister of Foreign Affairs envisaged by the Constitutional Treaty. Thus, the ESDP would have a clear operating goal in the foreign policy of the EU. By leading the Political Committee and the Security Committee and therefore combining control over EU military operations, the Minister of Foreign Affairs would be able to fulfil tasks of the European "Minister of Defence".

Poland saw no contrast between continued development of the European Security and Defence Policy and relations with the Alliance. Poland believed that this would generally raise the defence potential of the EU and improve the European component within NATO. In this context, Warsaw supported the French-German-British initiative to establish Battle Groups as it believed it would be a genuine contribution into development of the actual ESDP operating force38. A Polish-German battle group will launch in the first half of 2010 with Lithuanian, Latvian and Slovakian participation. Poland will act as the framework nation within the group. A decision was also made to establish another Group with Germany and France within the Weimar Triangle. The Group plans to attain operational readiness in 2013. A Visehrad Battle Group (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia) is planned to be established after 2015.

Poland and Germany represent similar positions on establishment of the Groups. The Groups cannot breach the integrity of NATO Response Force. Still, the danger is based on actual grounds. Collision may occur when the Groups are being established and during performance of operations. Since both rapid response forces are made from the same units of states which are members of both NATO and the EU, division of operations must be clearly regulated, and include the option of dividing competencies to make decisions on operational use.

There is an actual threat of competitiveness of the use of units (gradation of importance and meaning of conflicts) and, in a certain direction, their equipment and intraoperability with NATO and other EU contingents.

Given hardly constructive position of France, it will be difficult to solve the problem. Not a member of Alliance integrated military forces, Paris will most probably torpedo each initiative aimed at achieving permanent regulations.

Battle Groups are either purely national units or multinational units commanded on the basis of the framework nation concept, namely a rotational command.

Poland welcomed the project to establish Battle Groups. It could serve preparation of larger operations, performing the role of military avant-garde. The use of such forces in crisis situations, in particular to protect strategic interests of the EU on its outskirts, in Africa (peacekeeping operations) and falling states and locations where operations are particularly difficult such as deserts, mountains, jungles or urban areas. Still the concept of Battle Groups is related to development of a large number of individual, important details of purely military nature. These include achievement of uniform training of the troops of various nationalities, degree of multinationality, and the interoperability level of armed forces.

The most important issue seems to be the lack of funds to create another concept of a rapid response concept. The geographical scope of military interventions of battle groups increases financial demand for such operations. With lack of own means of air transport, the so-called strategic ability of moving and deploying EU troops and military equipment is very limited. An initiative such as Global Approach on Deployability, which might effectively prevent that problem, exists solely on paper. Further issues include lack of proper means of communication, reconnaissance and clear lack of consensus of the Member States as to the nature, definition, meaning and launch of certain military operations, along with national reasons and interest to participate in such actions. Battle Groups may face the risk of running virtual operations only.

Polish interests and the European Defence Agency

Establishment of the European Defence Agency (EDA) on July 5, 2004 was another instrument vital to the development of the European defence. The EDA was incorporated into the European Treaty with Art. I-41 and III-311. The EDA was established on the basis of a Resolution39 of the European Union. Thus, the EDA became an independent structure able to operate if the Constitutional Treaty was rejected. Since the EDA inception idea was based on numerous previously created European organisations for defence cooperation, the Agency will undoubtedly develop with success.

The first major step towards concentration of the armaments industries of the Member States was undertaken in May 2005, after dissolution of the West European Armaments Group. WEAG tasks were assumed by the EDA. Still, a pan-European discussion on the development of a common armaments market is necessary. This particularly includes rational division of tasks and financial resources in the armament sector among all the Member States. The need to develop the European Security Research Programme, ESRP, has also become an important issue.

Traditionally, the armaments sector of the Member States remains in the sole discretion of the national states. National control applies to manufacture, trade and supply of military materials. The issue of armaments is still excluded from the EU integration process. This policy is based on the legal grounds of Art. 296 of the EC Treaty which allows the Member States not to apply common market principles when such states can prove that the so-called essential interests of the security of the state are endangered. Since such interests are defined in a very broad aspect, the national armaments markets are also subordinated to such requirements. Member States rejected coordination of cooperation under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) on such an important issue of supply of military equipment40.

For Poland, the armaments policy of the state is primarily an instrument of foreign policy, security and defence and an area of making own sovereign national decisions,

Poland, with its poorly developed own armaments sector, was concerned with domination and control from larger Member States over its own defence industry. The most important part of the armaments industry and defence expenditures is concentrated in three states: Great Britain, France and Germany, not states like Poland. Along with Italy, Sweden and Spain, the three states account for more than 90% of armaments industries, 85% of armaments expenditures and 98% of funds invested into research and technologies. It is clear that with such extensive accumulated means, those states are not interested in participation of minor partners in joint armaments projects of the states the armaments industries of which play a minuscule role.

This is also fuelled by political and historical differences among the states with the greatest military potential in the EU, with their exuberant ambitions to play the leading role in the European continent.

All these factors considerably affect the fragmentation of the European armaments market, where own national interests of the Member States are represented.

Joint armaments projects require increased financial investments, which is difficult given tight military budgets and economic problems of the Member States. Considering the particular role of the state in that sector of national policies, it is impossible to introduce a natural form of competition between defence industries of the Member States. European armaments manufacture is reduced to the level of opposing intra-European competition. Today, we are dealing with extensive fragmentation and redundancy in the European defence market41.

It was only on May 14, 2007, that ministers of defence of 20 countries including Poland signed an agreement in Brussels on embarking upon the first joint research project of the European Defence Agency. The three-year-project pertains to "force protection", namely protection from weapons of mass destruction, anti-mine protection and remote detection of contamination. Poland, with 10m declared, is one of the main participants of the programme42.

"Strategic partnership" of Poland with the United States and the European Security and Defence Policy

When the Polish parliamentary elections of Autumn 2005 were won by the centre-right parties, Law and Justice (PiS) and the Civic Platform (PO), the Kaczyński brothers party, PiS, assumed complete control over the country. In the aftermath of the presidential election, Lech Kaczyński was elected president, and after short time of Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz as the Prime Minister, the twin brother of Lech, Jarosław Kaczyński, assumed that office. For the first time in history of democracy in Europe, the highest function in a Member State were assumed by two politicians coming from the same family. This was a global phenomenon.

Both cabinets, led by K. Marcinkiewicz and J. Kaczyński, moved forward the idea to pursue foreign policy of the state without amending its strategic priorities. The cabinets argued the change of "philosophy" of diplomacy and "realising" of the foreign policy. This was meant to clearly define and pursue national interests in the new geopolitical and economic constellation of the state43. Still, the Euro-Atlantic area was to remain the priority for the Polish interests. The European Union was to secure pursuit of the economic interests while NATO was to remain the guarantor of security. Both options were to complement, not compete with each other. Close cooperation between the EU and NATO was to be another major goal of the Polish foreign and security policy. This was supported by the declaration of the Marcinkiewicz cabinet to ensure active participation in the North Atlantic Alliance and the European defence structures. As a result, a reform of the Polish armed forces was declared; the forces were to be divided into two major types: territorial defence forces and main forces adapted to the new theatre of all anti-crisis operations outside the territory of the state. Policy of both cabinets was designed to further influence the development of the ESDP to increase the operating area and scope of that EU policy, provided that such a process would not reduce operating capabilities and position of NATO as the main organisation ensuring security of Poland on the European continent. In order to keep this process under "control", it remains in the Polish interest to support the development and harmonization between the EU and the US relations.

The main goal was and remained development of cooperation between Brussels and Washington and counteracting competitiveness in pursuit of the tasks and structures of both organisations. Mutual complementing in prevention, solutions of crises and stabilisation of post-crisis situation should be the basic goal of Euro-Atlantic cooperation. The government of J. Kaczyński also stresses the urge to build a noticeable presence of the European Union in the global policy and its active involvement outside the EU territory. The primary task is the evolvement of a militarily strong European Union, and then its political integration; not the other way round44.

Different positions of the majority of the Member States which support the political integration first and military later (or simultaneous performance of both processes, K.M.) is obvious. The correct proposal of the Polish party to create a certain "European army" with preservation of grounds for sovereign decisions pertaining to security of a national state is a mutually exclusive demand which has nothing in common with development of political realities in the EU. In addition, there is neither political will nor financial means in the EU to create such military units. The obvious "splits" in the Polish security policy lead to reduction in credibility of the Polish state in security concepts of the European Union. However, the loyalty of the Polish partner was defined as the strength of the state and contribution into development of partnership within Euro-Atlantic and European structures, not manoeuvring between the continental Europe and the American superpower. In this context, Poland should fully participate in continued development of the European Security and Defence Policy. The intention to install a part of the US Missile Defence system is perceived in Warsaw not as an anti-European move to weaken the ESDP, or an instrument of anti-Russian policy, but as a supplement to alliance guaranties for security of Poland. This is an understandable position given the obsolete air defence of the state, and merely partial application of Art. 5 of the NATO during the Iraqi crisis in 2003. For Poland, the "shield" lends credence to the automatic application of Art. 5 by binding the state with security guaranties ensured by the "strategic partnership" with the US in the form of Art. 5 plus.

The draft "New Strategy of National Security of the Republic of Poland" (as in preparation, May 2007, K.M.) refers to the fundamental importance of NATO for security of Poland. Still, Poland supports continued development of the ESDP and declares a considerable contribution into boosting military and civil capabilities of the EU as regards crisis response and increase in own contribution into development of European rapid reaction forces (e.g. Battle Groups) and active pursuit of the European Headline Goal 2010. One of the main tasks would be continued cooperation on defence industries, harmonization of acquisitions of military equipment, namely construction of an European armaments market and common military research programmes.

Poland's strengthening through development of the Euro-Atlantic partnership is an important part of future Polish involvement in the ESDP progress. Just like Warsaw, Washington clearly suggests that greater involvement is expected from European partners, in particular when the conflicts are purely European in nature. The Polish party expects that the ESDP should increase the importance of the European states in partner trans-Atlantic relations and thus strengthen the intra-NATO relations.

It is only the North Atlantic Alliance that is responsible for the collective defence of its members, as it fulfils tasks imposed by Art. 5 of the Treaty. In addition, next to the EU, the Alliance is responsible for the so-called international crisis management which comes down to tasks not covered by Art. 5. From the viewpoint of political and military relations, the Alliance still remains an irreplaceable partner for the EU from the viewpoint of Polish interests45.

Despite all those rational arguments to improve cooperation between the EU and NATO, with the ESDP being one of the instruments, Poland's distrust is still an issue. Warsaw believes that a common defence policy of the EU may weaken the already fatigued structure of the North Atlantic Alliance, increase competitiveness or self-reliance and thus emancipation of the European allied states from the "security guarantee supervision" of Washington. For Brussels, this is manifested by the development of the MD system in the territories of the new Central and Eastern European Member States46.

The problem of supplementing "common shortages" in the security issue of the EU and NATO has not been solved until now. Obstacles to this solution include different organisational structures and dissimilar approach of the EU and NATO to this issue. Both organisations still operate within different political and strategic systems. The EU's weakness is the largely declarative and not the actual contribution of the Member States into the common defence policy. Poland seeks "hard" guaranties for its own security and the ESDP, at its current stage of development, does not guarantee that. The ESDP needs more Community and more Europe, more decisions passed with a qualified majority of votes, less domination, greater trust and partnership within the EU-the same that the EU expects from the transatlantic relations.

Active support and strengthening of the ESDP lies in the long-term interest of Poland. Strong and efficient ESDP will ensure that the European powers will not be tempted to renationalise their foreign policies and Poland would stop thinking in historical categories pertaining to ensuring its national security47.

Despite varied political cultures, as far as the security policies go, the Member States must pursue a strategically joint and common, not a tactically opportunistic, foreign and security policy. The rise in security threats in both dimensions, on a regional and global scale, as well as interests of the classic European allies and weakened US, which have been drifting apart, causing instability and uncertainty in the era of war on multinational terror and new types of threats to international situation, must lead to the long-term strengthening of the ESDP regardless of whether the new European Treaty is adopted or not.

Tłumacz: Krzysztof Mazur

Weryfikator: Dorota Hanna Bartnik



1 This situation would later re-occur in Kosovo (1998) where the military domination of the United States in the policy of European security was overwhelming for the Europeans.

2 W. Link; Die Neuordnung der Weltpolitik. Grundprobleme globaler Politik an der Schwelle zum 21. Jahrhundert, Munich 2001, p. 11-22 and p. 148-150.

3 See Art. 17.2 of the TEU. Several months after assuming the position of the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana presented ESDP as the "EU fundamental integration project for the next century.

4 The process of the ESDP consolidation was not smooth. EU position largely driven by the negative attitude of Greece was heavily criticised by a NATO member, Turkey, which also intended to participate in the construction of EU defence architecture and for a long time had torpedoed NATO-EU rapprochement. Obviously Ankara perceived the whole conflict in the categories of its own future EU membership. The Turkish government defined possibilities of participation in the ESDP proposed by Brussels as insufficient. Ankara demanded greater participation in the ESDP decision-making process. The conflict was extinguished with mediation of Great Britain, which represented Turkish interest, and Greek concessions. See Ch. Hill "What is to be done? Foreign policy as a site for political action, International Affairs, no. 2/2003 p. 239. See Ch. Grant, A European view of ESDP, 10 September 2001, p. 1-2 http://www.endec.org/grant.htm

5 Articles 17 and 25 of the Amsterdam TEU were amended. All references to the Western European Union were deleted in Art. 17. Art. 25 regulated tasks of the Political Committee and Security Committee. Art. 25 provides decision-making rights for crisis situations. http://www. oeies.or.at/doku/0004nizza-esvp.html. S. Weska Deutschland und Frankreich-Motor einer Europaischen Sichersheits und Verteidigungspolitik? Munschner Beitrage ur europaischen Einigung. Baden-Baden 2006, p. 13.

6 Art. 17.1 Ibidem

7 J. Mawdsley, "Die Europaische Sicherheit- und Verteidigungspolitik in einer kooperativen Weltordnung" in: C. Hauswedell, C. Weller, U. Ratsch, R. Mutz, B. Schoh (ed.): Fridensgutachten 2003. Munster, Hamburg, London 2003, p. 148.

8 On the basis of the French-British proposal, the EU put forward an initiative to take over the NATO military mission in Bosnia (SFOR) in 2004. The European Union Rapid Reaction Force took over NATO mission duties in Bosnia. A total of 345 troops from 14 Member States and other states participate in the Concordia operation. Since January 1, 2003 a civil ESDP project has been pursued as well. Around 500 policemen from 15 Member States and 18 other countries participate in the police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina taken over from the UN. It is worth mentioning that the Western European Union (WEU) represented security interests of the members states of the European Communities only symbolically and could not have become a major security body of the EEC/EU. The role of WEU. During the East-West conflict, its function did not change. Thus, it could be assumed that the ESDP might become another inefficient defence organisation of the EU. The ESDP has not become autonomous yet. In spite of that, certain steps to activate the ESDP have been undertaken. The Kosovo crisis of the 1990s and the current issue of the future political status of that province will undoubtedly be one of the catalysers for the continued development of the ESDP, which will strengthen its ability to pursue military operations.

9 See final provisions of the Copenhagen European Council, December 12-13, 2002, 2487th Council Meeting, External Relations, Brussels, February 24, 2003, p. 11

10 On January 2003, the European Union decided to commence Concordia, a joint military operation of the Member States, to secure peace in Macedonia neighbourhood. The operation had been jointly prepared by the EU military staff with the European NATO command (SHAPE) in Brussels, with the French Major-General, Pierre Maral, as head of operations. The operation was led by the EU. Official Journal of the European Communities, Council Joint Action 2003/92/CFSP, L 34, February 2003, p. 26-29. See H-G Eberhard, "Die EU als militarischer Akteur in Macedonien: Lehren und Herausforderungen fur die ESVP", in: J. Varwick (ed.), Die Beziehungen zwischen NATO und EU. Partnerschaft, Konkurrenz, Rivalitat, Opladen 2005, p. 173.

11 http://ue.eu.int/solana/docs/03120BESS11DE.pdf

12 A.J.K. Bailes, "The European Security Strategy, an evolutionary history", "SIPRI Policy Paper" no. 10, February 2005, http://www.sipri. org/contents/publications/Policypaper10.html

13 The National Security Strategy of the United States of September 17, 2002 was not a uniform document; it consisted of a number of US President speeches from September 2001 to September 2002; http:/ /www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html; http://www.whitehouse.gov/news.releases/2002/10/20021006-6.html See differences between pre-emptive and preventive military actions in both doctrines. The action type is not identical. The US doctrine was more radical in this aspect.

14 The "strategy" binds the European states only in political rather than legal aspect. F. Heisbourg, "The 'European Security Strategy' is not a security strategy, in Centre for European Reform, A European way of war. London 2004.

15 Despite the joint EU position on Belgrade, without consulting their partners, on December 23, 1991 Germany unilaterally recognized independence of Yugoslavia republics, Slovenia and Croatia, thus provoking disintegration of the Yugoslavian state. See K. Miszczak, "New dimension of Germany's responsibility for security in Europe in the 21st century", R. Tomaszewski (ed.) Military cooperation between Poland and Germany in strengthening European security, Toruń 2002, p. 255.

16 K. Miszczak, "Polens Mitgliedschaft in der NATO und die Europaische Sicherheits- und. Verteidigungspolitik-ESVI", Eurojournal, no. 3-4/2000, p. 35-36

17 See in detail R. Zikba, "Poland and ESDP", in: H-G Ehrhart (ed.) Die Europaische Sicherheits- und. Verteidigungspolitik. Baden-Baden, 2002, p. 10-112, here p. 104

18 K. Miszczak, "The Role of Poland in Euro-Atlantic Relationship", Przegląd Środkowoeuropejski, no. 35/36, December 2003, p. 20-21

19 K. Miszczak, "Polens Aussenpolitik als Kunst der Balance. Europaische und amerikanische Interessen im Visier". Neue Zürcher Zeitung, September 4, 2003

20 See future Polish interests related to the Agency operations. Address of the Secretary of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, A.D. Rotfeld at The Armaments Sector and The European Defence Agency conference held in Warsaw on May 27, 2004

21 The original reads as follows: "…dans les principaux programmes européens d'equipement et dans l'activite de la l'agence européenne de capacites de defense", Protocol, Art. 2.a.

22 Art. 4 reads as follows: "The European Defence Agency shall contribute to the regular assessment of participating Member States' contributions with regard to capabilities, in particular contributions made in accordance with the criteria to be established inter alia on the basis of Article 2, and shall report thereon at least once a year. The assessment may serve as a basis for Council recommendations and European decisions adopted in accordance with Article III-312 of the Constitution." Until now, Poland has not become a member of the Agency.

23 In November 2000, Poland put forward a proposal to use part of its army forces for EU military operations. In 2004, Poland obliged itself to contribute the following forces to EU forces (Helsinki Headline Catalogue): approx. 1500 troops including the 18th Battalion of the 6th Air Assault Brigade, 7th Battalion of the Air Cavalry Brigade, Air Search and Rescue Group, An-28 transport aircraft, Krogulec mine hunter, and Piast rescue and support warship.

24 J. Solana presented "A Secure Europe in a Better World". The text of the document with minor corrections was adopted by the European Council on December 12, 2003 (http://www.eu.int/pressdata/EN/reports/ 76255.pdf) See E. Reiter, Die Sicherheitsstrategie der EU, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, January 19, 2004. B 3-4/2004 p. 26-31. Compare K.D. Schwarz, "Die erste Sicherheitsstategie der EU. Ein Kommentar zum Solana-Entwurf". SWP-Aktuell 47, November 2003.

25 See A.D. Rotfeld, "International security at the time of changes". Zeszyty Akademii Dyplomatycznej (Diplomatic Academy Worksheets), no. 8/2004, p. 13. See also N. Kasfir, "Domestic Anarchy, Security Dilemmas, and Violent Predation", in: R.I. Rotberg, (Ed.) When States Fail. Causes and Consequences. Princeton/Oxford 2004. p. 54-72.

26 The National Security Strategy of the United States of September 17, 2002 is not a not a uniform document; it consisted of a number of US President speeches from September 2001 to September 2002; http:// www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html; http://www.whitehouse.gov/news.releases/2002/10/20021006-6.html. The National Security Strategy of the United States is an coherent concept with clear operating structures of implementation. On the other hand, the European Security Strategy is a multinational declaration with the intention to be implemented in the future. The Member States are bound by the strategy provisions in political rather than legal terms. See R. Art, A Grand Strategy for America, Ithaka 2003, p. 87-92 J.L. Gaddis, "A Grand Strategy of Transformation", Foreign Policy, 133, Nov/Dec 2002, p. 50-57, S.P. Rosen, "An empire if you can keep it", The National Interest, Spring 2003. E. Rhodes, "The Imperial Logic of Bush's Liberal Agenda", Survival, vol. 45, Spring 2003, p. 131, 154.

27 Art. 1-41 of the TEU.

28 Details on permanent cooperation in defence area are provided for by Art. III 312 of the Constitutional Treaty and the so-called Protocol on permanent structured cooperation. The Protocol is an integral part of the Constitutional Treaty which regulates assumptions which must be fulfilled by a Member State to become a member of the "club" of permanent structured cooperation. The actual fulfilment of participation criteria is determined by the Council of Ministers based on the assessment of the European Defence Agency, EDA. At the initial stage, each member of the permanent structured cooperation is obliged to accelerate development of its defence capabilities, which could be pursued through participation in multinational armed forces and major European armament programmes as well as through development of cooperation with the EDA. No Member State can be forced to pursue such a cooperation. Since the EDA monitors activities pertaining to armament of the Member States, and the Council of Ministers may decide on the assumptions applicable to participation in the permanent structured cooperation (Art. III-312.4 of the Constitutional Treaty), a process of more dynamic cooperation of a group of states may occur. This may also increase the level of acceptation and understanding of the need to establish a common European defence and its impact on governments and societies of the Member States.

29 In November 2002, at the European Convention forum, Germany and France presented the joint initiative for further ESDP development to create the European Security and Defence Union (ESDU). Gemeinsame Erklarung Deutschlands, Frankreichs, Luxemburgs und Belgiens zur Europaischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik, Brussel, 29 April 2003 http://www.auswaertiges-amt…/Ausgaber archiv

30 "Gemeinsame Erklarung Deutschlands, Frankreichs, Luxemburgs und Belgiens zur Europaischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik", Brussel, 29 April 2003 http://www.auswaertiges-amt…/Ausgaber archiv

31 This initiative is not formally pursued as part of the ESDP. The main goal of the initiative is to strengthen EU crisis responses, which also constitute a part of the ESDP operations.

32 G. Lindstrom, "Enter the EU Battle groups". Chaillot Paper, no. 97, February 2007, p. 12-15.

33 See 2582nd Council meeting, external relations, Brussels, May 17, 2004

34 Based on the "single set of forces" concept, where the same units of states which belong to NATO and the EU will be used in operations of both organisations.

35 Compare: Distanced position of Poland, K. Miszczak, "Common Foreign and Security Policy and EU Defence Identity Policy in the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe". Przegląd Środkowoeuropejski, no. 2/2004 (July/August). p. 10-12

36 The decision to create 13 battle groups was made at the meeting of EU defence ministers on November 22, 2004, http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/ cms-Data/docs/pressData/en/misc/82761.pdf Compare: Battle Groups to strengthen EU military crisis management? European Security Review, no. 22 of April 2004. Such a structure of a French-German battle group began to operate in the early 2005. A Polish-German battle group will launch in 2009 with Lithuanian, Latvian and Slovakian participation. Germany will command one and participate in four battle groups.

37 Creation of Battle Groups was highly desired. The use of such forces in crisis situations, in particular to protect strategic interests of the EU on its outskirts, in Africa (peacekeeping operations) and falling states and locations where operations are particularly difficult such as deserts, mountains, jungles or urban areas. Still the concept of Battle Groups is related to development of a large number of individual, important details of purely military nature. These include achievement of uniform training of the troops of various nationalities, degree of multinationality, and the interoperability level of armed forces. The most important issue seems to be the lack of funds to create another concept of a rapid response concept. The geographical scope of military interventions of battle groups increases financial demand for such operations. With the lack of own means of air transport, the so-called strategic ability of moving and deploying EU troops and military equipment is very limited. An initiative such as Global Approach on Deployability, which might effectively prevent that problem, exists solely on paper. Further issues include the lack of proper means of communication, reconnaissance and clear lack of consensus of the Member States as to the nature, definition, meaning and launch of certain military operations, along with national reasons and interest to participate in such actions. Battle Groups may face the risk of running virtual operations only. For details see K. Miszczak, "Battle Groups/European Rapid Reaction Forces", Przegląd Środkowoeuropejski, July, no. 40/2005, p. 29-32.

38 K. Miszczak, "Germany and Poland versus the European security policy". Sprawy Międzynarodowe, no. 1/2005, p. 102.

39 See. Draft Council Joint Action for the establishment of the European Defence Agency (EDA). No. 10450/04, Brussels, June 11, 2004

40 B. Schmitt, "Rustungszusammenarbeit in Europa: Zeit fur Reformen", in: H.-G. Ehrhart, B. Schmitt (ed.) Die Sicherheitspolitik der EU im Werden. Bedrohungen, Aktivitaten, Fahigkeiten, Baden-Baden 2004, p. 214f.

41 For more information see K. Miszczak, "Implementation of the Constitutional Treaty and the future of the EU Defence Identity Policy", Sprawy Międzynarodowe, no. 1/2005, p. 101-103.

42 Polska Zbrojna no. 21, May 20, 2007, p. 58 France and Germany to spend 12m each.

43 See exposé of PM K. Marcinkiewicz of November 10, 2005, http:// www.premier.gov.pl

44 See parliamentary speech of the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Anna Fotyga of 11.0.2007, http://www.msz.gov.pl

45 The Amsterdam Treaty already changed dimension of the EU and NATO relations. According to the EU, the Alliance remained a central component and basis for collective European defence for the NATO member states. The EU policy must be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within its framework. See note 12.

46 Construction of the Missile Defence (MD/NMD) system and European participation in the system was a classic subject of a NATO-US and EU dispute. The continental EU Member States were sceptical of the idea suspecting that development of the system would provoke an armaments race. See M. Aguera, "ESDP and Missile Defence: European Perspectives for More Balanced Transatlantic Partnership" December 2001 http://www.hsfk.de/abm/print/forum/agueera_1.htm Poland backed the project.

47 Compare K. Miszczak, "Polens Beitrag und Verantwortung fur Europa/Poland's Contribution and Responsibilities for Europe", Eurojournal, No. 1/2003, p. 9-13.


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