- The UK and the EU face daunting common security challenges. However, EU-UK defence co-operation remains limited and the UK’s relationship to EU defence instruments is shallower than that of many other non-EU partners. Labour’s idea of a security pact has become mired in the broader discussions over the EU-UK reset.
- Most defence co-operation in Europe happens bilaterally, in NATO and in small groups. However, the EU’s role is also growing. The EU has established funds to foster joint defence research and procurement, and to expand industrial production. The EU’s role in financing defence is likely to expand, for example by directing more of the EU budget to defence or by issuing defence bonds.
- The EU’s defence toolbox only allows for limited involvement by non-EU countries, excepting Norway, which is formally associated to EU defence tools. In theory, participation by non-EU countries and companies is possible. But in practice, it is limited by a range of conditions that are mainly designed to prevent the involvement of US firms. These conditions, however, also affect the UK.
- The easiest way for the EU and the UK to deepen co-operation is to reap some quick wins. By the date of their May summit, they should conclude a security and defence partnership to formalise their foreign policy dialogue. The partnership should either include or set out a timeline for the UK’s association to the European Defence Agency (EDA) and for its possible participation in EU military operations.
- The UK and the EU should also work together closely in developing options to channel additional funds to defence. A co-ordinated funding injection would frontload spending, increase co-operation and send a strong signal to Europe’s allies and adversaries. It would not be easy for the UK to participate in an EU defence bond issue, but the UK could be involved if the bonds were issued by a coalition of countries. There is also scope to work together on plans for a defence bank.
- The EU could take unilateral action to integrate the UK more closely in its defence capability development efforts, to benefit from its large and advanced industrial capacity and expertise. And if the EU does issue defence bonds in its own right, it could make it possible for UK companies to plug into individual projects.
- For its part, the UK should seek formal association to EU capability development tools. One way to do this would be by copying Norway’s association model. This would allow UK defence firms to participate in consortia on equal footing with EU firms and would entail a UK financial contribution to EU instruments. The association agreement could contain a safeguard mechanism, as the UK’s contribution to Horizon Europe does.
- An alternative to the Norway association model would be for the UK and the EU to agree on a bespoke model. This could be based on a ‘pay-to-play’ mechanism, allowing UK entities to participate in EU projects as part of consortia, bringing their own funding – and without benefitting from any EU funds.
- Reaching an agreement will not be easy. Defence needs to be disentangled and elevated from the discussions surrounding the implementation and revision of the UK-EU Trade and Co-operation Agreement (TCA). Linking the UK to EU defence tools as closely as possible would strengthen the pan-European defence industrial base and make a decisive contribution to Europe’s security. Failure to work together will only make Europe weaker.
The UK and the EU face enormous common security and defence challenges. The threat from Russia’s revisionism, combined with Trump’s threats, means that Europeans urgently need to strengthen their defences. Yet, EU-UK co-operation in defence is underdeveloped – in fact the UK’s relationship to the EU in defence is currently more shallow than that of other major non-EU NATO allies like Norway or the US.
When the Labour government assumed office in July last year, it made strengthening relations with the EU in security and defence a priority in the context of the broader UK-EU reset. Yet, plans for a UK-EU security partnership have been slowed down by broader disagreements about UK-EU relations, including possible revisions or extensions of the Trade and Co-operation Agreement (TCA) signed in 2020. These talks have been marked by disagreements over issues such as fishing quotas and youth mobility. This policy brief starts by setting out why UK-EU co-operation is a key building bloc of a stronger European security posture. It then takes stock of the reasons for the current lack of UK-EU defence co-operation, its risks and missed opportunities. Finally, it makes recommendations on how the EU and the UK should deepen co-operation.
cer.com Policy brief
07 March 2025
