Ursula
von der Leyen wants her Commission to be ‘geopolitical’. COVID-19
is likely to make this harder, while also underlining its importance.
The fallout from COVID-19 will further destabilise
Europe’s neighbourhood, at the same time as China, Russia and
Turkey are becoming more assertive. The way the EU responds to these
challenges will be a test case for whether it can act more
geopolitically.
Many of the EU’s neighbours will
struggle to cope with the economic and social impact of the
pandemic, even if COVID-19 has not so far hit most of them hard. Few
of these countries are in a position to enact the measures necessary
to restart their economies. Many are dependent on income from
tourism, which is unlikely to recover fully soon. Others, such as
Algeria and the Gulf states, rely on energy revenues, and will suffer
from the fall in global prices. Exports will fall, investment will
dry up, foreign-currency denominated debt will balloon and
remittances from citizens overseas will shrink
Economic
difficulties will translate into reduced government revenue and
increased unemployment. This will fuel social strife and give renewed
impetus to street protests, like those last year in many countries in
the Middle East and North Africa. At the same time, there is no sign
that the pandemic is leading to a lull in ongoing conflicts in Libya
or Syria. Both people fleeing from conflict and those seeking better
economic opportunities are likely to migrate to Europe in large
numbers, potentially causing a repeat of the 2015-2016 migration
crisis. This could strengthen anti-immigration eurosceptic parties
and deepen divisions between member-states, destabilising the
Union.
The EU’s biggest neighbours, Russia and Turkey,
have caused the Union many headaches in recent years. Russia has
resisted resolving the Ukraine conflict, and has increased pressure
on the EU’s eastern member-states. For the first time since the
break-up of the Soviet Union, Moscow has established itself as a
Mediterranean power, thanks to its involvement in Syria and Libya.
Meanwhile, Turkey-EU tensions have risen due to Turkey’s drilling
for gas near Cyprus, and Ankara’s intervention in the Libyan
conflict. There is little sign that COVID-19 will push Turkey and
Russia to lower their ambitions. Moscow is seeking to consolidate its
influence in Libya. Turkey has also established itself in Libya, and
shown no indication of wanting to calm tensions in the eastern
Mediterranean. Russia and Turkey could use their footholds in Libya
to manipulate migration flows to the EU. Moreover, both Moscow and
Ankara could become even more assertive if their economic
difficulties mount.
At the same time, the pandemic has
been accompanied by a more aggressive Chinese foreign policy. Beijing
mismanaged its initial response to COVID-19, and has sought to
deflect blame. It has threatened countries that have criticised it,
and tried to influence public opinion by spreading disinformation and
providing high-profile assistance to EU member-states like Italy.
China has also taken advantage of the confusion created by the
pandemic to tighten its grip on Hong Kong. These moves have sharpened
tensions between the US and China: President Donald Trump has blamed
Beijing for the pandemic, and stated that he wants to decouple the US
economy from China. The US has pressured Europe to support its harder
stance, pushing Europeans to exclude the Chinese firm Huawei from
their 5G networks.
Whether Trump wins a second term or
not, the US will continue to push the EU to take a firmer stance
towards Beijing. Democrats agree with Trump that the US needs to be
tougher, even if their rhetoric is softer. The EU shares many of the
US’s concerns. Even before the pandemic the Commission had defined
China as a ‘systemic rival’. Europeans increasingly agree with
the US that they must be more assertive in defending their interests.
The Commission wants to make it harder for Chinese firms that receive
state subsidies to invest in Europe or bid for contracts. But
member-states are unwilling to be as tough on China as the US is:
their initial reaction to Beijing’s move to curtail Hong Kong’s
autonomy was relatively muted, with little discussion of measures to
deter China from further action. And most member-states remain
unwilling to exclude Huawei from their 5G networks, fearing that
China may restrict access to its market in retaliation. European
opinions of China may have
hardened,
but
the EU seems keen to stake out its own approach rather than following
the US. This is likely to lead to increased transatlantic friction.
Europe
will need to prevent its neighbourhood from becoming even more
unstable, helping the
region to deal with the health emergency and weather COVID-19’s
economic blow.
But
funding for EU external action and defence programmes in the
2021-2027 EU budget has been sharply reduced compared to the
Commission’s original proposals – by €15 billion in the case of
external action funds. If the EU wants to prevent its neighbours from
becoming destabilised, it will also need to take more responsibility
for regional security. Europeans can no longer rely on the US: even
if Joe Biden is elected the US is likely to prioritise China over the
Middle East. In order to be less vulnerable to migration blackmail
attempts, member-states need to build a humane and functional
migration policy. Finally, Europe will need to defend its economic
interests against China, rebalancing its relationship with Beijing
and working with the US, without being dragged into a new Cold War.
The risk is that Europeans may be too weak economically
and divided politically to tackle these challenges effectively.
Member-states have become tougher on China, but economic difficulties
may deter them from being more robust, for fear of compromising their
economic recovery. Member-states may also be unwilling to provide the
EU’s neighbours with the assistance they need to fight the pandemic
and mitigate its economic consequences. They may decide to cut
defence budgets, undermining their ability to deter aggression.
Finally, Europeans may be unable to agree on how to stabilise their
neighbourhood. There is little sign of them converging on a common
Libya policy, with France, Greece and Cyprus supporting the rebel
General Khalifa Haftar in order to curtail Turkey’s influence,
while Italy favours the UN-backed Government of National
Accord.
Internal political divisions will also continue to
weaken the EU. The recovery fund is an important step forward, but it
may not be enough to generate a strong economic recovery in the
countries hardest
hit by the coronavirus recession, such as Italy and Spain.
Disillusionment with the EU is likely to continue to fester in many
member-states, and the rise to power of a eurosceptic populist
government in a large member-state like Italy or France will continue
to be a real risk that could sabotage efforts to make the Union more
assertive on the global stage.
COVID-19 makes a more
geopolitical Commission more necessary than ever. At the same time,
there is a risk that the economic crisis and internal divisions will
make member-states more inward-looking. But if they neglect the
international challenges Europe faces, they will only store up bigger
problems for the future.
Luigi Scazzieri is a research fellow at the Centre for European Reform.
cer.uk 27 July 2020