The euro area’s bail-out strategy is not working. It is time for insolvent countries to restructure their debts
FOR a few weeks over the Christmas holidays, Europeans put their sovereign-debt crisis on hold. Now they are facing grim reality once more. Bond yields are spiking in an ever broader group of countries, just as the euro zone’s governments need to raise vast sums from the markets. On January 12th Portugal was forced to pay 6.7% for ten-year money—better than feared but a price it cannot afford for long. Yields for Belgian debt have jumped, as investors fret about its load of debt and lack of leadership. Spain is hanging on.
This mess leads to a depressing conclusion: Europe’s bail-out strategy, designed to calm financial markets and place a firewall between the euro zone’s periphery and its centre, is failing. Investors are becoming more, not less, nervous, and the crisis is spreading. Plan A, based on postponing the restructuring of Europe’s struggling countries, was worth trying: it has bought some time. But it is no longer working. Restructuring now is more clearly affordable than it was last year. It is also surely cheaper for everybody than it will be in a few years’ time. Hence the need for Plan B.
The initial response, forged in the rescue of Greece in May 2010, has been undone by its own contradiction. Europe’s politicians have created a system for making loans to prevent illiquid governments from defaulting in the short term, while simultaneously making clear (at Germany’s insistence) that in the medium term insolvent countries should have their debts restructured. Unsure about who will eventually be deemed insolvent, investors are nervous—and costs have risen.
The least-bad way to deal with this contradiction is to restructure the debt of plainly insolvent countries now. Based on this newspaper’s calculations (see article), that group should start with Greece and probably also include Portugal and Ireland. Spain has deep problems, but even with a big bank bail-out it should be able to keep its public debt at a sustainable level (see article). Italy and Belgium have high debt levels but more ample private savings, and their underlying budgets are closer to surplus. There is, thus, a reasonable chance that, handled correctly, euro-zone sovereign defaults could be limited to three small, peripheral economies.
This newspaper does not advocate the first rich-country sovereign defaults in half a century lightly. But the logic for taking action sooner rather than later is powerful. First, the only plausible long-term alternative to debt restructuring—permanent fiscal transfer from Europe’s richer core (read Germany)—seems to be a political non-starter. Some of Europe’s politicians favour closer fiscal union, including issuing euro bonds, but they are unlikely to accept budget transfers big enough to underwrite the peripheral economies’ entire debt stock.
Second, the dangers from debt restructuring have diminished even as the costs of delay are rising. Eight months ago, when euro-zone governments and the IMF joined forces to rescue Greece, their determination to avoid immediate restructuring made sense. There were reasonable fears that default could plunge Greece into chaos, precipitate bond crises in the euro zone and spark a European banking catastrophe.
But the European economy, as a whole, is now in better shape. Banks have had time to build up more capital—and palm off some of their holdings of dodgy sovereign bonds to the European Central Bank. Greece and other peripherals have shown their mettle with austerity plans. Europe’s officials have created mechanisms to stump up rescue money quickly. And lawyers have been thinking about managing an “orderly” default. A sovereign restructuring could still spook financial markets—fear that it would spread panic makes Europe’s politicians shy away from it—but if handled correctly, it should not spawn Lehman-like chaos.
At the same time the costs of buying time with loans have become painfully clear. The burden on the countries that have been rescued is enormous. Despite the toughest fiscal adjustment by any rich country since 1945, Greece’s debt burden will, on plausible assumptions, peak at 165% of GDP by 2014. The Irish will toil for years to service rescue loans that, at Europe’s insistence, pay off the bondholders of its defunct banks. At some point it will become politically impossible to demand more austerity to pay off foreigners.
And the longer a restructuring is put off, the more painful it will eventually be, both for any remaining bondholders and for taxpayers in the euro zone’s core. The rescues of Greece and Ireland have increased their overall debts while their private debts fall, so that a growing share will be owed to European governments. That means that the write-downs in any future restructuring will be bigger. By 2015, for instance, Greece could not reduce its debt to a sustainable level even if it wiped out the remaining private bondholders.
A cost-benefit analysis, in short, argues in favour of carrying out an orderly restructuring now. The debt reduction should be big enough to put afflicted economies on a sustainable path. Greece may have to halve its debt burden. Ireland’s may need to be cut by up to a third, with some of this coming from writing down bank rather than sovereign debt.
All creditors, including governments and the European Central Bank, will have to chip in. New rescue money will also be needed: to fund defaulting countries’ budget deficits; to help recapitalise these countries’ local banks (which will suffer losses on their holdings of government bonds); and, if necessary, to recapitalise any hard-hit banks in Europe’s core economies. The ECB and others should stand ready to defend Belgium, Italy and Spain if need be.
If Europe’s leaders stick to plan A, the debt crisis will continue to deepen. If they get on with restructurings that are eventually inevitable, they have a fighting chance of putting the crisis behind them. Plan B will require deft technical management and political courage. Thanks to its emerging-market expertise, the IMF has some of the former. It is up to Europe’s politicians to find the latter.
Źródło: The Economist Jan 13th 2011 | from PRINT EDITION