Warszawskie Biuro ECFR 23 listopada 2017 r.
Uczestnicy debaty:
Andrew Wilson – Senior Policy Fellow w ECFR i profesor Ukrainian Studies na University College London, Kristi Raik – Senior Research Fellow w programie European Union Research w Fińskim Instytucie Spraw Międzynarodowych, Katarzyna Pełczyńska-Nałęcz, Dyrektorka programu Otwarta Europa w Fundacji im. Stefana Batorego
Andrew Wilson: patrz – Policy recommendations
UE – Partnerstwo Wschodnie
Katarzyna Pełczyńska- Nałęcz
Ciągle mamy problem nie tylko w krajach członkowskich, ale także w krajach partnerskich, który sprowadza się do pytania, – po co nam właściwie to Partnerstwo Wschodnie, i do czego ono właściwie służy? W moim dzisiaj przekonaniu Partnerstwo Wschodnie to nie jest polityka ani antyrozszerzenie, bo takie były zamysły, ani prorozszerzenie, czyli wstęp do rozszerzenia UE. Nie. Na dzień dzisiejszy to jest przede wszystkim polityka rozbrajania bomby nadal trwającego rozpadu Związku Radzieckiego. Ten rozpad nie dokonał się 25 lat temu, on ciągle trwa. Ten rozpad polega, po pierwsze na ciągłej rosyjskiej niezgodzie na suwerenność ościennych krajów i agresywnym działaniu przeciwko tej suwerenności, a po drugie to oznacza niepełną zdolność krajów postradzieckiech do uniesienia swojej suwerenności. Ta moneta ma dwie strony.
Ta sytuacja rozpadającego się ciągle imperium stwarza poważne zagrożenie, w tym zagrożenia bezpieczeństwa rozumianego w bardzo różnych akcentach dla Unii Europejskiej. Stwarza też pewne możliwości powstania prawdziwie suwerennych państw, które mogą być partnerami na różnych poziomach. Polityka partnerstwa Wschodniego dzisiaj jest unijnym instrumentem do przekuwania tego niebezpiecznego procesu na coś bardziej bezpiecznego dla UE.
Czy Partnerstwo Wschodnie jest w kryzysie? Ja bym powiedziała, że Partnerstwo Wschodnie jako takie nie jest w kryzysie. W kryzysie są natomiast nasze relacje z krajami PW gdyż sama Unia jest dzisiaj bardzo podzielona i patrząca na własne problemy, stąd ma mniejsze możliwości intensywnego działania na zewnątrz wobec wschodnich partnerów. W kryzysie są procesy transformacyjne u naszych wschodnich sąsiadów, ale samo Partnerstwo jest metodą ma przeżycie tego kryzysu. Gdyby nie instytucjonalizacja unijnej polityki wschodniej to dzisiaj tej polityki w ogóle by nie było; byłby chaos i próżnia. A jest Partnerstwo. I myślę, że to jest wystarczające oby jakieś emocje wokół tej polityki obudzić.
Andrew Wilson napisał w swoim tekście, że jest to de facto polityka rosyjska, i wobec Rosji. Proszę zauważyć, że mówiąc o PW mówi się tylko o jednym, kraju, tj. o Ukrainie. Ja bym poszerzyła tę definicję i powiedziałabym, że jest to de facto polityka rosyjsko – ukraińska, dlatego, że ten proces rozpadu Związku Radzieckiego skumulował się najbardziej właśnie w tych dwóch krajach, i w konflikcie o Ukrainę. Ukraina jest dzisiaj fundamentalnie istotna. To, co się stanie na Ukrainie zadecyduje o całej reszcie Partnerstwa Wschodniego, ale to wcale nie znaczy, że pewnego dnia nie będzie to w ogromnym stopniu także polityka białoruska. Tak się może stać. Ona pewnie mniej już będzie kiedyś gruzińska, azerska, ormiańska czy nawet mołdawska, bo z punktu widzenia fundamentalnych interesów UE to jest po pierwsze Ukraina, a po drugie Białoruś. Białoruś jest w pewnym uśpieniu, ale wcale to nie znaczy, że to jest sytuacja na zawsze.
Co zatem dalej z Partnerstwem Wschodnim? Te realistyczne rekomendacje zostały przytoczone w tekście Wilsona. Ja bym chciała zwrócić uwagę na jedną rekomendacje, mianowicie na obecność w obszarze konfliktu. Nie jestem przekonana do możliwości jakieś misji w zakresie bezpieczeństwa i polityki zagranicznej, natomiast zdecydowanie to, co jest potrzebne, to obecność UE, i przedstawicieli UE, w tzw. formacie normandzkim, czyli w tym formacie, w tym gremium, które dzisiaj na poziomie politycznym, tzn. Ukraina, Rosja, Niemcy, Francja omawia sprawy strategiczne dla konfliktu w Donbasie.
Jest w moim przekonaniu ogromnym, kuriozalnym, nie do wybaczenia fakt, iż UE w tym formacie nie ma, i jest realistycznym, aby Unia nie tyle włączyła się do na pełnych zasadach, gdyż teraz na to jest już za późno, ale przynajmniej uczestniczyła na pozycji obserwatora. Jest to realne, możliwe i niezwykle potrzebne.
Rozłączenie kwestii polityki wobec kryzysu w Donbasie z polityką Partnerstwa Wschodniego jest absolutnie słuszne. Nie ma efektywnej polityki Partnerstwa Wschodniego bez przynajmniej obecności Unii w kwestii rozwiązywania konfliktu rosyjsko – ukraińskiego o Wschodnią Ukrainę.
Sprawa Polska. To jest jedyny punkt, z którym nie mogę się zgodzić. Nie jest tak, że Polska jest przeciwna Partnerstwu Wschodniemu. Politycy obecnego rządu na samym początku nieco hamowali namiętności krytykowania poprzedniej władzy. Ale mimo wszystko zostali sprowadzeni, albo sami się sprowadzili, do pozycji realistycznej, pragmatycznej. Polska dyplomacja działając ramię w ramię z dyplomacją szwedzką naprawdę bardzo dużo zrobiła przed kryzysem Partnerstwa Wschodniego, aby zadbać o język Deklaracji szczytowej, o wprowadzenie nowych elementów do Partnerstwa Wschodniego. Takim nowym elementem jest położenie nacisku na włączenie, w wymiarze infrastrukturalnym, UE w kraje Partnerstwa Wschodniego. To nie jest jakiś wielki wymiar, ale jest to praktyczne, opłacalne, niekonfliktowe rozwianie, i jest czymś nowym. I pod tym hasłem „ connectivity” staje się dzisiaj jednym z głównych haseł PW a polska dyplomacja była i jest tutaj aktywna. Ja nie często chwalę polską dyplomację, ale tutaj z całą szczerością i uczciwością muszę powiedzieć, że Polska nie jest dzisiaj przeciwna Partnerstwu Wschodniemu.
Partners for Life Europe’s Unanswered “Eastern Question”
Policy recommendations
Andrew Wilson
It is highly unlikely that the European Union will introduce any major changes to the Eastern Partnership either at this year’s summit, or any time soon. Even with the apparent retreat of populism, political realities in Europe and Russia’s continued interest in making its presence felt in the neighbourhood, militate strongly against any upgrade in activity there. At the same time, there is little appetite for any EU retreat from the region. As a result, the EU should instead focus on defending current commitments and implementing what has been already agreed. The DCFTAs are in place but will take five years to enact completely.
Over that period, the challenge for the EU and any future neighbourhood policy will be to make sure that enthusiasm for the EU in partnership countries continues, even in places enacting DCFTAs which may bring pose some difficulty in reform. Though the EU should work hard, as it is already doing in many respects, to frontload the policies that make most impact on ordinary people’s lives in the region, such as making visa-free travel a reality and showing how EU trading standards benefit ordinary consumers. But, as the 2017 EU-Ukraine summit showed, when the Dutch objected to a phrase dating from the 2015 EaP summit, that the EU “acknowledges Ukraine’s European aspirations and welcomes its European choice”, too much open discussion
of distant scenarios and over-reach can lead to pushback. But if the populist tide is now ebbing, the EU has scope to be bolder. The EaP is not a standalone policy. It is a reflection of the EU itself; it is as ambitious as the EU and member states want it to be.
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36 ECFR interview with EU diplomats, 24 August 2017.
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But if the status quo is the most likely scenario, the EU should really be aiming for the ‘status quo plus’. The aim should now be for ‘smart reform’: understanding the nuances within as well as between partnership states, and in Ukraine in particular the EU should make sure that well-intentioned
policies are not subverted on the Ukrainian side. The EaP needs to find traction and branding to provide the capital that local reformers need, and to shift dynamics in the EaP states out of their current stalemated or piecemeal approach.
As a result, the EU should consider pursuing the following
actions:
Implement current agreements and look ahead to a future round of agreements
A grand new political narrative on the future of the east might create more leverage and help push through EaP reforms, but it is unlikely to emerge. But EU leverage still comes from fear of even greater Russian dominance and from the EU’s economic attraction. Realistically, the EU cannot offer
security guarantees, but its one big offer is integration into the single market. Some, like former NATO head Anders Fogh Rasmussen, have argued for extra incentives, such as a new customs union.37 This would be seen as leapfrogging – adding on new policies before existing ones have bedded
down. But one useful negative incentive might be a payback clause, to claw back EU funding, if targets are not met, to incentivise implementation.
But leverage will also be a micro affair, over the long haul. Implementation of the Association Agreements will not come about via the signing of documents or high political ceremony. It will be a drawn-out process. The EU will constantly have to make alliances, within and around
partnership states, for every small step in the process. This will be a case of finding the right levers and individual pressure points.
Get the language right
What the EU says in public matters, and actively influences the course of debate in Ukraine and other partnership states. For example, the EU questioned the legitimacy of the NGO Public Integrity Council at the EU-Ukraine summit. It also quoted an unhelpful Council of Europe opinion, which
the Ukrainian authorities then re-quoted to justify their backsliding on judicial reform.38
Interlocutors in EaP states complain that the EU gives them a ‘permanent cold shower’; language and atmospherics do matter. The EU should be able to find warmer and more positive language and expressions of solidarity. Local politicians and civil society activists do not expect EU membership overnight; but those who want to campaign
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37 Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “The Case for an EU-Ukraine Customs Union”, Project
Syndicate, 12 July 2017, available at
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/eu-
ukraine-customs-union-by-anders-fogh-rasmussen-2017-07?barrier=accessreg
.
38 “Support to the Implementation of the Judicial Reform in Ukraine”, Council of
Europe, 14 June 2017, available at
http://www.coe.int/en/web/kyiv/-/on-12-june-2017-
an-opinion-of-the-council-of-europe-on-compliance-of-the-rules-of-procedure-of-the-
public-integrity-council-with-the-standards-and-rec
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for closer relations with Europe need some political capital from the relationship to prevent public opinion turning sour at home. Poroshenko has personally insisted on returning to the issue of membership wording for his 2019 campaign. But this year’s EaP summit should avoid having its energies
sapped by another dispute about “European aspirations”. Article 49 allows any European state that fulfils the Copenhagen criteria to apply for EU membership, and that is that. The summit should seek a form of words that conveys a broader and warmer expression of solidarity than Ukraine has heard in recent years.
Make trade-offs that keep Eastern Partnership states involved
The EU has now incorporated ‘security’ and ‘resilience’ into the EaP. But this means some difficult trade-offs. The EU has a mixed record in judging these well. In Moldova the EU got things wrong twice. Ukraine cannot be given a blank cheque in the name of its own national security. On the other hand, there is a good case for the EU’s recent rapprochement with Belarus, supporting its sovereignty and freedom of choice in foreign policy, even though there has been little progress towards political liberalisation.
However, the EU should show some tough love too. Greater flexibility in engagement does not mean that the EU should abandon conditionality. If it does, the impetus to reform, that the EaP has helped to generate, will weaken. Any argument that Ukraine should be allowed to concentrate on the war alone is a dangerous illusion.39 In current circumstances, it would only strengthen the hand of the counter-revolutionaries, and create more internal conflict
in the long run.
Involve Eastern Partnership states in internal EU decision-making
There should be more provision for involving partnership states in internal EU debates. The EaP should also have a much stronger inward focus, making the case to home EU audiences about why it is still worth engaging with the east. Support for visiting experts from partnership states would
be an ideal way of increasing the sense that the EU values the east.
The debate initiated by Juncker on the ‘Future of Europe’ will be incomplete if it remains solely inside the EU. Ukraine should be invited to take part.
Connect Ukraine to Europe – physically
In September 2017 Poroshenko claimed that “Ukraine has become the de facto eastern border of united Europe”.40
More could be done to make that claim a reality. Moreover, now that there are DCFTAs, there needs to be better physical
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39 Roman Sohn and Ariana Gic, “West needs to get real on Ukraine”,
EU Observer, 27 September 2017, available at
https://euobserver.com/opinion/139169
.40 “Opening speech at the 14th Yalta European Strategy Annual Meeting ‘Is This a New
World? And What Does It Mean for Ukraine?’”, available at
http://www.president.gov.
ua/en/news/vistup-prezidenta-ukrayini-na-14-j-shorichnij-zustrichi-yalt-43298
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links for trade. The EU can help Ukraine with overcoming the legacy of post-colonial infrastructure. Even from Odessa, it is easier to get to Moscow than it is to Romania. An extension of TENs (Trans-European Networks) funding for upgraded and new roads and waterways would be ideal.
People also need to be connected. Only three million Ukrainians have the biometric passports needed to be able to take advantage of visa-free travel. The EU should keep pushing for cheaper travel, even though a putative deal with Ryanair to be based at Kyiv airport fell through in 2017. The main national carrier, Ukraine International Airlines, is also trying to go low-cost.
The EU could move towards abolishing roaming charges in Ukraine. These are the things that matter in people’s daily lives.
Help Ukraine achieve energy independence
The EU could do a lot to help Ukraine achieve energy independence and promote mutually beneficial energy cooperation. Ukraine can be integrated into ENPSOG (gas) and ENTSO (electricity). The EU could take a softer line on unbundling Naftohaz Ukraїny. Ukraine is expected to do this much faster than many central European states: unbundling transmission would help reduce corruption (see above), but Ukraine wants to keep its underground storage capacity within the state monopoly for strategic reasons.
Set up an ‘Intermarium-lite’
Energy cooperation between Ukraine and Poland has a promising future. Additional reverse flow gas could come from the new Polish LNG terminal at Świnoujście, via swap schemes or by adding a short interconnector, of less than 200 kilometres, under the European Commission’s Fund for Common Interests. The EU can help Ukraine move forward with the proposed ‘Ukraine-EU Energy Bridge’, once some power stations in the west of the country are switched over to export to Poland.
Ukraine can quietly step up security cooperation with Poland and other neighbours. On the other hand, Ukraine’s vision of the Intermarium focuses on the Black Sea while Poland looks to the Baltic Sea. Cooperation within the EaP is a good way of strengthening ties between Ukraine and Moldova and
the south Caucasus states, to which Kyiv is currently only weakly linked via the ‘Community of Democratic Choice’ and GUAM (the ‘Organisation for Democracy and Economic Development’).
Strengthen the multilateral dimension
This paper has focused mainly on Ukraine. But the multilateral dimension of the EaP is crucial. It gives more reluctant states like Belarus the ability to ‘hide under an umbrella’, without Russia objecting to them talking to the EU. If Belarus says it is too closely tied to Russia, the EU
can point to Armenia which had already joined the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (in 2015), but then signed a ‘Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement’ with the EU (in 2017).
Maintain credibility and communication
EaP actors constantly raise the issue of ‘double standards’. The EU must be tougher on democratic erosion inside the EU, particularly in states like Hungary, if its democratisation policies are to have credibility in the east. The EU has not always communicated the practical benefits of its policies. Where policies work, they should be loudly proclaimed. The EaP states’ access to the Erasmus+ scheme for scholarly exchanges, for example, does not get the publicity it deserves.
Get more involved in peacekeeping
As of autumn 2017, there is suddenly a lot of diplomatic movement around the Donbas conflict. Russia and Ukraine have both put forward rival proposals for the insertion of peace-keeping forces. The EU, however, is not currently actively involved in either the stabilisation efforts on the
ground or the diplomatic negotiations. But leaving the Minsk process to France and Germany and more general monitoring efforts to the OSCE only reduces the EU’s leverage in Ukraine. Brussels should appoint an EU envoy dedicated to the Ukraine and should take a seat in the Minsk process. The EU could also deploy a Common Security and Defence Policy confidence-building mission to eastern Ukraine. This could be an unarmed, civilian, and non-executive mission, initially operating in the parts of Donbas controlled by Kyiv but then in the entire territory if conditions allow.
